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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
THAT DEFENDANT JOHNSON'S NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
Defendant Johnson recognizes that summary judgment is usually inappropriate on the

issue of proximate causation, and that a trial court is only allowed to grant summary
judgment in the most "clearest" of cases. (Defendant Johnson's Brief, pg. 8.) However,
Defendant Johnson did not cite the Court to any cases where an appellate court found that
a trial court properly granted summary judgment in a similar case. Instead of citing the Court
to any on-point authority, Defendant Johnson argued that this is one of those clear-cut cases
by trying to distinguish the present case from the three Utah cases1 that Plaintiff cited in
support of his appeal.
The Court should reject Defendant Johnson's argument, because it is not supported
by Utah law. The three cases that Plaintiff cited were from the Utah Supreme Court and,
therefore, represent the controlling law on this issue. They are the most analogous cases
from the Utah Supreme Court, and in each of those cases the court made it clear that the issue
of proximate cause needed to be submitted to the jury. The Court should likewise find that
this issue needed to be submitted to the jury, because a reasonable jury could find that
Defendant Kidman's negligence was foreseeable to Defendant Johnson.

1

Harris v. U.T.A., 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983); Jensen v. Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 611 P.2d 363 (Utah 1980); and Waiters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978).
1
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Defendant Johnson's attempt to distinguish this case from the controlling Utah law
is without merit. Defendant Johnson believes that his admitted negligence in losing control
of his car was too remote in time to be a proximate cause. None of the Utah Supreme
Court's cases have set an arbitrary time limit for determining proximate causation in similar
situations. Indeed, the original tortfeasor in Jensen created the hazardous situation by
blocking the intersection with its van when it started working on the telephone lines the
morning of the accident. It was not until 2:00 p.m. that afternoon that the subsequent
tortfeasor approached the intersection, waited for a few minutes, and then decided to try to
drive around the original tortfeasor's van.
Here, only 20 minutes had passed from the time when Defendant Johnson negligently
created a hazardous situation and when the subsequent tortfeasor came on scene. And it only
took Defendant Kidman 10 more minutes to pull his car back onto the freeway. Courts from
other jurisdictions have found that time periods much greater than the present should go to
the jury. See, e.g., Cooke v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 14 So.3d 1192 (Fla. Ct. App.
2009) (question of fact for the jury even though the subsequent accident happened one hour
after the first and one to one-and-a-half miles down the road); Smith v. Commercial Transp.,
Inc., 470 S.E.2d 446, 449 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) ("While the five to six hours and two miles
separating the accidents in this case are certainly factors to be considered in the foreseeability
analysis, we cannot agree that they are decisive as a matter of law."); Taylor v. Jackson, 643
A.2d 771 (Pa. Comm. Ct. 1994) (jury should decide whether the first accident was a
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proximate cause of the third accident, despite two hours and one mile separating the three
accidents); and Herman v. Welland Chemical, Ltd,, 580 F.Supp. 823 (M.D. Pa. 1984)
(denying a motion to dismiss, even though there was a six-hour separation). Defendant
Johnson has not cited the Court to any cases to the contrary.
Moreover, the hazardous situation that Defendant Johnson created was still persisting
at the time of the crash. Defendant Johnson admits that he foreseeably created a hazardous
condition in the median. (Defendant Johnson's Brief, pg. 11.) However, Defendant Johnson
seems to believe that sliding into the median was too remote in location to foresee causing
a hazardous situation on the abutting freeway. This argument ignores the realities of the
situation Defendant Johnson created.
When Defendant Johnson called for assistance, he knew that he was going to have to
get help to get towed out of the median. The only way for this to happen was for a tow truck
to pull him back onto the freeway. Defendant Kidman quickly pulled Defendant Johnson's
car out of the median. However, Defendant Johnson's car was still connected to the tow
truck on the side of an ice-slicked road, which presented an ongoing hazardous situation that
Defendant Johnson set in motion for oncoming motorists. Consequently, the hazardous
situation that Defendant Johnson created was not spatially limited to the initial resting point
of his car, and Defendant Johnson did not cite the Court to any authority for limiting his
liability to accidents in the median.
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The situation may have been different, for example, if the accident between Plaintiff
and Defendant Kidman happened after the tow had been completed and the parties had left
the scene on their separate ways. Under those circumstances, Defendant Johnson may have
been able to argue that he could not foresee that Defendant Kidman would negligently cause
a collision after he was done trying to remedy the situation that Defendant Johnson created.
The realities, however, are that the collision with Plaintiff happened while the hazardous
situation that Defendant Johnson created was still ongoing. Thus, it was not too remote in
time or location.
Defendant Johnson also tries to distinguish our case by concluding that Defendant
Kidman's actions were "highly extraordinary." (Id. at 14.) Defendant Johnson supports this
conclusion by stating:
Defendant Kidman's actions were highly extraordinary considering the
weather, the icy road, his location at the bottom of a hill, and the speed of
traffic on an interstate highway. It is even more extraordinary that Defendant
Kidman blocked a portion of the roadway in performing his work. Indeed, the
record is full of examples of highly extraordinary actions on the part of
Defendant Kidman given the circumstances.
(Id. at 22.)
None of these facts show that Defendant Kidman did anything that was "highly
extraordinary." To the contrary, it was Defendant Johnson who negligently lost control of
his car in bad weather, on an icy road, and at the bottom of a hill alongside a freeway.
Defendant Kidman did not decide where this would happen, but was called to fix the problem
that Defendant Johnson created. Tow-truck drivers are regularly called to remove vehicles
4
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that have slid off freeways in bad weather, and Defendant Johnson has not cited the Court
to any evidence that Defendant Kidman's actions were different - let alone extraordinarily
different - from what another tow truck driver would have done under the circumstances.
The fact that the tow truck blocked a portion of the freeway represents nothing more than
ordinary negligence. And a reasonable jury could conclude that blocking a portion of the
freeway was foreseeable, because Defendant Kidman was trying to tow a car out of the snow
in a steep, slick median without much room alongside the freeway.
Defendant Johnson also argues that his actions were not the proximate cause because
he did not direct Defendant Kidman's actions. Defendant Johnson has not cited the Court
to any authority that the first actor must direct the subsequent actor's conduct. Perhaps that
is because Utah law is clear that this issue does not depend upon control of the subsequent
actor, but upon the foreseeability of their actions. Jensen, 611 P.2d at 365 (Utah 1980) ("[I]n
a situation involving independent intervening cause, the primary issue is one of the
foreseeability of the subsequent negligent conduct of a third person ....").
Defendant Johnson seems to have incorrectly construed Plaintiffs argument as saying
Plaintiff believes Defendant Johnson was responsible for creating the poor roadway
conditions. (Defendant Johnson's Brief, e.g., pgs. 20-1.) Plaintiff is not blaming Defendant
Johnson for the snow, bad weather, or icy roadway conditions. However, Defendant
Johnson's knowledge of these facts, coupled with his admitted fear that other accidents
would happen in the area (R. 321, pg. 10), provides an additional basis for him to have
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reasonably foreseen that a subsequent accident may occur while Defendant Kidman was
trying to extricate his car under those conditions.
In short, Defendant Johnson has failed to meet his burden of showing that there were
no genuine issues of material fact on the issue of proximate causation. There is no dispute
that Defendant Johnson set the chain of events in motion that led to the crash. And the sole
issue for decision is whether a reasonable jury might conclude that Defendant Johnson could
have foreseen that a tow truck driver may have contributed to a collision on an ice-slicked
freeway while trying to remove Defendant Johnson's car from the median. All minds may
not agree on the outcome of this issue, but reasonable minds could differ.
II.

THE CONTINUED VALIDITY OF SUPERSEDING CAUSE IS NO LONGER
AT ISSUE IN THIS APPEAL.
Plaintiff originally argued that the Court should find that a superseding-cause analysis

in a negligence case was no longer necessary in light of Utah's comparative-fault laws.
However, since filing Plaintiffs appellate brief, this Court issued its opinion in Gardner v.
SPXCorp., - P.3d - , 2012 WL 503722 (Ut. Ct. App. 2012), in which the Court appears to
recognize the continued validity of the rule. Id. at ^ 35. Therefore, Plaintiff is withdrawing
that argument on appeal.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to enter an order
reversing the trial court's ruling and remanding this case for a trial on the merits.
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